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Abstract
This paper studies whether Swedish workers use the unemployment insurance (UI)
system as a pathway to retirement. We use longitudinal register data consisting of
weekly UI benefit payments for the period 1999 to 2015. In Sweden, individuals
are eligible for UI benefits for a maximum of 427 days. This creates an artificial
benefit threshold at 427 days prior to the o cial retirement age. We use a novel
quasi-experimental approach that exploits the distribution of UI benefits and started
UI spells close to retirement. We find that a disproportionate large share of total
UI spells start at this threshold, which indicates that individuals seek to maximize
benefits before retiring. Our results detect moral hazard and suggest that UI benefits
induce early retirement. Furthermore, the results suggest that individuals use UI
benefits in a strategic manner.
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1 Introduction
Labor force participation among older workers have fallen in almost all developed economies
(Dorn and Sousa-Poza, 2010). Studies often explain the decline as a consequence of gen-
erous pension systems (e.g., Hausman and Wise, 1985; Feldstein and Liebman, 2002).
Yet, more recent literature emphasizes alternative pathways, such as the unemployment
insurance (UI). For instance, job search requirements are typically less demanding for
older workers (Hairault et al., 2012), and elders might even be exempt from job search
while receiving benefits (Gruber and Wise, 1998). In addition, empirical evidence shows
that an extension of the maximum length of benefits increases the incidence of early re-
tirement (Inderbitzin et al., 2016). These indices propose that unconventional pathways
to retirement are important to understand early retirement patterns.
While previous studies highlight the impact of UI benefits, the amount of quasi-
experimental evidence is scarce. Most studies use policy changes to evaluate causal
e↵ects (e.g., Lalive, 2008); however, these findings are likely restricted to the particu-
lar institutional setting. For example, while most developed economies have mandatory
UI schemes, the Swedish system builds on voluntary insurance provided by private unem-
ployment insurance funds (A-kassor). This type of fundamental institutional di↵erences
among countries will likely result in di↵erent outcomes. Hence, further studies focusing
on unexplored institutional settings are necessary to provide further understanding how
UI a↵ects early retirement.
In this paper, we identify how Swedish workers use UI benefits as a pathway to retire-
ment. More precisely, we apply a novel quasi-experimental approach to detect workers
who self-select into UI spells prior to the o cial retirement age of 65. In Sweden, indi-
viduals are eligible for UI benefits for a maximum of 427 days. This creates an artificial
benefit threshold at 427 days prior to the age of 65. We exploit the variation in benefit
usage at the threshold to detect distortive e↵ects on older worker’s labor supply. In ad-
dition, our empirical approach allows us to distinguish moral hazard in the Swedish UI
system.
We use detailed data from the Swedish Unemployment Insurance Board (IAF), which
provides a longitudinal register of individual unemployment insurance payments for the
period 1999 to 2015. The data includes the reason for the individual’s deregistration
from the UI system and at what date the deregistration took place. This allows us to
separate the individuals who left the system at the o cial retirement age. In addition,
the data allows us to cleanly categorize benefit payments, started UI spells, and entries
into the UI system with respect to days to retirement. In addition, the register includes
additional information on demographics, region of residence and whether the person is
born in Sweden. These variables serve as controls in our regressions.
Our analysis relies on graphical evidence of the unconditional distribution of payments
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and started spells. In addition, we develop a simple theoretical framework in which we
interpret the results. The hypothesis is that individuals seek to retire at 427 days prior
to retirement to maximize the benefit duration while minimizing labor income losses. We
study the pattern of payments to establish the correlation between payments and days to
retirement, which is tested through placebo regressions. Furthermore, we use density tests
to test for manipulation in the number of started spells around the 427-day threshold.
Last, we check the robustness of our results by examining entries into the UI system prior
to retirement, and use descriptive evidence to see how entitlement to benefits correlate
with durations.
The results contain three main findings. First, benefit payments increase exponentially
before retirement. However, while benefit payments depict a discontinuity in means at the
427-days threshold, this discontinuity is almost zero when narrowing the bandwidth and
allowing for di↵erent slopes at each side of the threshold. Likewise, the result is similar for
our placebo regressions. Hence, we find that there is no discontinuity in benefit payments
due to the UI setting. This is consistent with moral hazard in the UI system and worsen
labor market opportunities for older workers.
Second, we turn to started UI spells as a potential cause to the increased benefit
payments. We find a discontinuity and bunching in started UI spells at 427 days prior
to the retirement age of 65, and a decline in started spells thereafter. This contradicts
our previous finding, and indicates that people adjust their behavior to exploit the full
length of benefits. To test the significance of the bunching, we use density tests to
simultaneously check for selection around the threshold. These results show significant
manipulation around the threshold. The manipulation indicates that individuals prefer to
retire at, or close after, the threshold, to avoid an income penalty. Similarly, we interpret
the significant discontinuity as moral hazard in UI system.
Third, we show that our results are robust to entries into the UI system. There is no
sign of excessive entries prior to retirement. Thus, neither the increase in benefit payments
nor the started UI spells are driven by new members. Furthermore, there is heterogeneity
in durations among individuals. More specifically, people with low historical use (high
entitlement) have higher durations close to retirement than further away. This indicates
that individuals might justify excessive benefit use with their previous contribution to the
system.
This paper relates to the literature on institutional causes for early retirement. Several
studies focus on social security benefits (e.g., Hausman and Wise, 1985; Gruber and
Wise, 2000; Feldstein and Liebman, 2002) and the statutory early retirement age (Manoli
and Weber, 2016) as causes of early labor market exits. In contrast, we focus on UI
benefits as an alternative pathway to retirement in Sweden. Earlier studies find that
UI benefits prolong unemployment durations and induce early retirement (Lalive et al.,
2006; Kyyra¨ and Ollikainen, 2008), interacts with early retirement plans (Fitzenberger
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and Wilke, 2010) and might complement or substitute other insurances to further induce
early retirement (Inderbitzin et al., 2016). In addition, Manoli and Weber (2016) exploit
discontinuities in a national rule for employer-provided retirement benefits in Austria and
find spikes in the retirement frequency at di↵erent benefit thresholds.
We add to the literature on UI benefits and early retirement in three ways. First, we
use a unique and detailed data set of individual UI payments in Sweden. This allows us
to study the link between UI benefits and early retirement in a new institutional context.
Second, while previous studies focus on unemployment durations for older workers and
the likelihood of early retirement, we evaluate selection into early retirement through the
UI system. We provide a novel empirical strategy that draws from the bunching literature
(see e.g., Busse et al., 2013; Allen et al., 2016) to examine the distribution of started spells
for older workers. Further, we apply common manipulation tests and find that selection
occurs at the maximum length of benefits prior to the retirement age. Third, we are able
to cleanly illustrate, through both graphical and statistical evidence, that the timing of
labor market exits depends on the UI rules.
We also contribute to the literature on moral hazard in UI systems. Earlier studies find
that UI benefits cause longer unemployment durations which are interpreted as evidence
of moral hazard (Mo tt, 1985; Katz and Meyer, 1990). However, we acknowledge that the
duration alone is often an incomplete measure of moral hazard. For example, UI durations
are uninformative about employment after the end of benefits (Card et al., 2007) or fail to
incorporate liquidity constrains (Chetty, 2008). Likewise, our empirical strategy allows us
to identify moral hazard while also examining the underlying mechanism. We apply the
theoretical framework of Lindbeck (1995) which separates moral hazard into two separate
channels. Our results indicate that early labor market exits is characterized by a strategic
use of benefits.
Last, we draw insights from the behavioral economics literature. Social norms a↵ect
to what extent individuals are willing to exploit social insurances (Lindbeck and Persson,
2017). This is because deviating from a norm results in a utility loss (Akerlof and Kranton,
2000). Our results contribute by concluding that pecuniary incentives for early retirement
seem to outweigh the social stigma of exploiting the UI system.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides information on
the Swedish institutional framework for the unemployment insurance. Section 3 presents
our rational agent model and adds a complementary theoretical framework. Section 4
describes our data and Section 5 explains our empirical strategy. Section 6 presents our
results and the corresponding robustness and heterogeneity checks. Section 7 discusses
and concludes our findings.
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2 Institutional Background
The Swedish unemployment insurance (UI) system is characterized by two components:
voluntary unemployment insurance fund membership and state subsidized financing of the
system (Clasen, 2011). The UI scheme is administrated by 28 private unemployment in-
surance funds with around 3.5 million members in total. The funds have historically been
directly a liated with the Swedish trade unions, although they are nowadays required
to be completely independent from other organizations. The close historical relationship
between UI funds and trade unions is major explanation for both the high union density
and the large number of unemployment fund memberships in Sweden (Kjellberg and Ib-
sen, 2016). This close relationship created a norm of a dual membership in both a trade
union and the related unemployment fund.
The Swedish UI system consists of two protections: an universal basic insurance pro-
vided solely by the state and a voluntary insurance o↵ered by the unemployment insurance
funds. The universal insurance o↵ers benefits to unemployed workers who lack an unem-
ployment fund membership or individuals who been members for less than 12 months.
The universal insurance provides SEK 365 for a maximum of 300 workdays. The voluntary
part is based on the individual’s former income and it o↵ers benefits for 300 workdays at
maximum. However, since unemployed workers do not receive any benefits on weekends,
the length of the benefit period spans over 427 days in total (the same logic applies to
the universal insurance). The daily benefit is at most 80 percent of an individuals former
pay, or a maximum of SEK 680 per day, during the initial 200 days of unemployment.1
The maximum percentage is reduced to 70 percent during day 201 to 300. The unem-
ployment funds provide insurance to all persons above 20 who have been members for at
least 12 months, been working for at least 20 hours per month over the last six months,
and are registered at the Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsfo¨rmedlingen) as
unemployed. Furthermore, when workers turn 65, they are automatically unregistered
from the system.
The unemployment funds are financed through two sources. The main part, ap-
proximately 62 percent, was in 2013 financed by the state through payroll taxes and
self-employed contributions (Kjellberg, 2010). The other part is financed through the
insurance fund’s monthly membership fees, which varies between SEK 85 and SEK 145
depending on fund a liation.
1These benefit levels were active between 2007 and 2015. In 2015, the benefit levels were raised to
just above the level prior to 2007. However, the rule of 300 days has been the standard throughout the
whole sample period. In our empirical approach we exploit the maximum length of benefits and not the
maximum amount of daily benefits. This implies that the exact level of daily benefits is not crucial to
our analysis. Furthermore, we use the same argument for individuals only receiving universal insurance;
it is the maximum length of benefits that matters, not the benefit level.
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3 Theoretical Framework
In this section we present a theoretical framework in three separate sections. First, we
introduce the concept of moral hazard within the scope of UI benefits. Second, we use
the assumption of a rational agent to model early retirement as a consequence of UI ben-
efits. Third, we draw insights from the behavioral economics literature as an alternative
explanation for the retirement decision.
A. Moral Hazard in Unemployment Insurance Systems
The market failure associated with moral hazard arises from information asymmetry where
the behavior of the insured agent is unobservable to a principal (Hindriks and Myles,
2013). In terms of UI systems, moral hazard implies that benefits reduce e↵ort and
increase both the likelihood and the duration of unemployment. The UI benefits distort
relative prices of leisure and consumption, which reduces the marginal incentive to search
for a new job. The principal’s ability to address the information asymmetry depends on
the level of available information and its capacity to monitor the agent. In most cases, the
principal attempts to specify precise contracts to induce desired behavior from the agent.
For instance, UI contracts always restrict the maximum period of benefits. Furthermore,
government interventions are likely to improve e ciency when moral hazard is present.
The beneficial e↵ect stems from the government’s capacity to tax and subsidize. More
precise, taxation of insurances cause firms to o↵er insurance at less than the fair price.
As a consequence, individuals overconsume insurance to a less extent and expend more
e↵ort, which improves e ciency.
To what degree moral hazard a↵ects work e↵ort and work absence behavior might
be explained by the type of benefit dependency. Lindbeck (1995) di↵erentiates between
two types of benefit dependency: those who become pacified due to benefits and those
who actively live at the expense of taxpayer’s money. This distinction can be interpreted
as two channels through which UI benefits a↵ect early retirement. The former would be
associated with individuals who stop looking for jobs after becoming unemployed in the
end of their working life. The later is more in line with our model and is characterized by
individuals who rationally calculate and adjust their labor market participation according
to the specific benefit rules.
B. A Simple Rational Agent Model
We construct a model showing how UI benefits induce moral hazard and early retirement.
The model builds on the assumption of a rational agent who tries to maximize utility.
Consider an old worker who chooses between continue working or retire: L 2 {0, 1}.
Here, L = 1 denotes leisure (early retirement), and we assume that early retirement is an
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irreversible decision.2 The individual selects the alternative that maximizes future utility
pay-o↵s before the o cial retirement age. The decision takes place over t days, [0, . . . ,
T], where t is defined as number of days prior to the o cial retirement age. Ut(L0) defines
the utility derived from continue working until the o cial retirement age, while Ut(L1)
denotes the utility from retiring in the same day. We assume that each day is independent
and that utility is fully separable over periods. If the individual chooses an early labor
market exit, she is eligible for daily benefits B¯ for a maximum amount of days, k.3 For
simplicity we assume that B¯ is the same amount in every t. Furthermore, we assume that
individuals do not receive any daily wage Yt or B¯t after the o cial retirement day, defined
as T .
Overall, there are three factors determining how much an individual can receive in
total benefits B when retiring in di↵erent t. Formally, the benefit scheme is defined as:
B =
8<:B¯t ⇥ k if t   kB¯t ⇥ t if t < k (1)
An individual who retire at t > k will receive the maximum benefit amount, given by B
times k. However, since the worker retire “too early” she will obtain a certain amount of
residual days, between the last day of benefits and the o cial retirement day T . During
these residual days, the individual receives neither wage payments nor benefits. We denote
these lack of income as daily income penalties Pt. In contrast, an individual who retire
at t = k receives also the maximum amount of benefits, although she does not obtain
any residual days. Last, retirement at a later stage, t < k, results in less than maximum
benefits, given by B¯ times t.
Figure 1 illustrates the problem of choosing the optimal t with a pay-o↵ tree, where
the individual can retire in three di↵erent states. Even though some individuals with high
enough wages prefer to continue working until the o cial retirement age, we exclude this
option in our model. We also define that Yt is higher than the daily benefit amount B¯ for
all t. In addition, there is a (dis)utility from working, 't, corresponding to each workday.
Furthermore, given that we assume no uncertainty regarding pay-o↵s, the aggregated
utilities are known in every state. The individual will choose to retire in the state where the
total benefits from early retirement is as large as possible compared to the utility derived
from continued work until the o cial retirement day. Hence, aggregated income from
continue working
P
Yt can be interpreted as the reservation utility of early retirement.
2This is plausible assumption if we believe that workers, prior to retirement, are less attractive on
the labor market (Go¨bel and Zwick, 2009).
3For the Swedish UI system, k is equal to 300 work days (427 calendar days).
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Figure 1: Utility based pay-o↵s
Notes: This figure shows the utilities from retirement, L = 1, and continued work, L = 0, for
the three states: t > k, t = k and t < k. For simplicity we assume that the discount factor is
  = 1.
Before we determine the preferred state, we define the di↵erent states in terms of utility
Ut(L1) =
8<:B¯t ⇥ k +
P
't  
P
Pt >
P
Yt if t > k
B¯t ⇥ k +
P
't >
P
Yt if t  k
(2)
We start from the bottom node, t < k, and move upwards to find the optimal state. First,
we note that the discounted total benefits at t < k is lower than at t = k. Hence, an
individual with a strictly increasing and concave utility function will never continue to
node t < k, which is dominated by t = k. Further, node t > k results in a certain amount
of penalty days,
P
Pt, which means that t = k also dominates t > k. Therefore, the
model suggests that it is most beneficial to retire in the second state where the number
of penalty days are zero and the individual receives maximum benefits. We therefore
expect retirement decisions to take place around t = k.4 The logic behind this prediction
is that individuals, at this particular t, both maximizes the number of benefit days and
the number of payment days, while minimizing the total disutility from working prior to
the o cial retirement age.
C. Bounded Ratonality and Behavorial Economics
The prediction of the model outlined above builds on assumptions of a rational agent. Yet,
theories within behavioral economics have either questioned the degree of rationality or
added other aspects – such as social norms and identity – as bases for economic decisions.
We therefore highlight behavioral concepts that might influence early retirement decisions.
4In the Swedish context, this would imply that individuals seek to retire at t = 427.
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Bounded rationality is the idea that rational decision-making is restricted by cognitive
limitations and the tractability of the decision problem. According to Simon (1955) and
Conlisk (1996), psychological limitations make the predictive ability incomplete. In the
context of our model, individuals might miscalculate the di↵erent utility streams from
either continued work or early retirement. This implies that workers might choose a
retirement day that is not optimal from an individual economic viewpoint. Instead,
workers seek a satisfactory day of retirement.
Individuals are not only driven by economic motives. Instead social norms influence
decisions and preferences (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) that a↵ect economic outcomes. To
what extent individuals adhere to norms is determined by the private cost – or the social
stigma – that individuals experience when opposing the desirable behavior. According
to Lindbeck and Persson (2017), the discomfort decreases as more people violate the so-
cial rule. This means that norms are endogenous. Lindbeck (1995) claims that a basic
dilemma for the welfare state is that generous benefits tend to create many beneficiaries.
He hypothesizes that disincentive e↵ects on work e↵ort from UI benefits will increase
gradually as others decide to misuse benefits. Thus, to what degree moral hazard inher-
ited in the UI system a↵ects early retirement is determined by how individual’s benefit
dependency has formed other worker’s attitudes towards UI usage. Social norms might
initially constrain the influence of economic disincentives in UI systems, but the same
disincentives might erode the same constraints in the long run.
4 Data
Our empirical analysis uses data from the Swedish Unemployment Insurance Board (IAF),
which contains a detailed longitudinal register over unemployment insurance payments
for the period 1999 to 2015. The data covers benefit payments and the corresponding
date of compensation. One main feature of the register is the detailed individual enroll-
ment information. More precise, the data contains date specific information on A-kassa
membership status, ranging from the first entry to the last exit (retirement). At the
age of 65, individuals become ineligible for receiving UI benefits and are automatically
unregistered from their respective A-kassa. Thus, we are able to sort out individuals who
left the UI system because of retirement. Furthermore, we link payment and membership
data to demographic and geographic registers. This provides a rich longitudinal data set
with controls, including educational level, whether the person was born in Sweden or not,
county of residence, age and gender.
The final data covers 21 135 retirees unregistered from their A-kassa at the retirement
age of 65. These retirees have corresponding 2 236 095 weekly benefit payments over the
period 1999 to 2015. We also construct a longitudinal series for the following outcome
variables: weekly benefit payments, started UI spells and entries into the UI system. Thus,
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we get a panel for the outcome variables over days to retirement with binary variation
in the outcome variables. The benefit of this approach is that we exclude the individual
dimension in the data, allowing us to plot the unconditional distribution of payments.
Thus, we can cleanly examine the distributions of our outcome variables over days to
retirement in an intuitive way. Furthermore, we are able to reintroduce the individual
aspect of the data in our econometric analysis.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Control variables
N Mean Std.Dev Max Min
Education 21,135 2.038 0.732 3 0
Native 21,135 0.886 0.318 1 0
Birth year 21,135 1946 5.583 1954 1934
Gender 21,135 0.400 0.490 1 0
Panel B: Outcome variables
N
Payments 2,198,228
Started spells 23,090
Entries 21,135
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for our sample. Panel A presents the summary
statistics for our control variables. Panel B presents the frequencies for the outcome variables. Since
the outcome variables are unconditional these are presented as frequencies. We examine the outcomes
further in the result section. In addition, we only include the latest individual entry into the system.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the control and the outcome variables. The
sample consists of 60 percent males, the mean level of education is high school and almost
90 percent of the sample was born in Sweden. Note that the outcome variables are
presented unconditional of the individual dimension. Hence, these are left as frequencies,
which are further examined in detail in the result sections. In addition, entries into the
system had missing information for multiple entrants. Consequently, we include the latest
entries into the system which are equal to the total number of individuals examined. We
proceed with our empirical strategy.
5 Empirical Strategy
To estimate selection into early retirement through the Swedish UI system, there are at
least three challenges that are likely to confound the results. First, benefit payments
are not random, and thus, comparisons at di↵erent days to retirement might contain
biases. Without credible exogenous variation in benefit payments, we cannot exclude
9
sorting among payments. Second, payments are insu cient to fully control for selection.
For example, the underlying cause might depend on longer durations or excessive initi-
ations of UI spells. Third, empirical evidence suggests that early retirement decisions
involve strategic interaction between the employee and the employer (Dorn and Sousa-
Poza, 2010). Strategic interactions lead to a reverse causality problem, which result in
biased estimates. Thus, we cannot distinguish whether the cause of retirement is an active
choice by the employee or the consequence of downsizing in a specific sector.
To tackle these challenges, we use the specific setting of the Swedish UI system prior
to the o cial retirement age. One essential feature of the Swedish UI setting is that
individuals are eligible for benefits up 427 days. This creates an artificial threshold where
individuals, based on the previous theoretical discussion, are encouraged into early retire-
ment. Thus, the probability of using UI benefits increases exogenously at the threshold
which provides plausible exogenous variation in the number of benefit claimants. We also
expect that strategic individuals, who seek to retire early through the UI system, are well
informed about their own retirement situation.
This setting is particularly useful to tackle the first two challenges. We use the max-
imum length of benefit as a threshold providing exogenous variation. Accordingly, our
hypothesis is that there should be a jump in benefit payments at 427 days prior to retire-
ment. In addition, the Swedish register data is well suited to examine selection in benefits
payments through the number of started spells. In the case of selection, we expect started
UI spells to bunch at the maximum length of benefits prior to the o cial retirement age.
Last, our strategy use that the Swedish UI system is voluntary, and thus, individuals can
strategically enter the UI system. This allows us to check for excessive entries to control
for potential selection prior to the threshold.
We address the statistical challenges through a graphical analysis, and further ap-
ply appropriate regressions and tests to control the significance of discontinuities. Note
that we do not interpret jumps in the number of payments or started spells as causal
e↵ects, since our identification strategy assumes that there is manipulation in the out-
come variables. The excess payments or started spells at the threshold are likely to be
caused by strategic use of benefits. Furthermore, we use advances in the bunching liter-
ature (for overview, see Kleven, 2016) to address the manipulation. Formally, we apply
density tests with di↵erent bandwidths for our running variable, which controls whether
the manipulation is significant or not. A significant result rejects the hypothesis of no
manipulation.
The third challenge of the potential biases is likely to be a minor issue in the insti-
tutional setting of the Swedish UI system. The problem of strategic layo↵s is associated
with flexible labor markets with weak employee protection (Card et al., 2007). In con-
trast, Swedish employees are protected by the Employment Protection Act, which applies
a “First-in, last-out” principle. This rule explicitly inhibits age discrimination. For ex-
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ample, Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2010) find that the early retirement age is the main de-
terminant for forced layo↵s. However, the early retirement age is common knowledge for
the employers, which makes a strategic layo↵ initiated by the employer more likely. In
contrast, UI association is private information and not necessarily known by the employer,
and consequently making a strategic layo↵ by the employer less likely. We now proceed
to our result section where we present our results in three sections.
6 Results
In this section, we present our results in three separate subsections. First, we examine fre-
quencies of weekly benefit payments close to retirement, in particular around the threshold
of 427 days prior to the o cial retirement age. This establishes the fundamental relation-
ship between days to retirement and benefit payments. Second, we test for selection close
to the same threshold by examining the number of started UI spells at di↵erent stages.
Given the logic of our theoretical model and the Swedish institutional setting, a started
UI spell late in life implies retirement. Third, we test both the robustness of our findings
and heterogeneity by evaluating entries into the system and by introducing entitlement
to benefits. For each separate subsection, we provide necessary empirical specifications
and placebo tests.
A. Weekly Payments
We start by plotting the unconditional distribution of weekly payments of benefits over
days to retirement. Figure 2 plots benefit payments for 1 800 days prior to retirement
binned into monthly averages. Here, zero marks the o cial retirement age of 65 and the
distribution is divided into spans of 427 days. There is an exponential increase in benefit
payments starting two spans away from the threshold. This establishes a positive corre-
lation between benefit use and worker’s age. However, while the underlying distribution
resembles a smooth exponential function, the regressed means between time-spans shows
a discontinuity at the 427-days threshold.
This potential discontinuity is the main focus for the proceeding analysis. Although
we intuitively expect older unemployed to use more benefits because of declining produc-
tivity or worse labor market opportunities (Go¨bel and Zwick, 2009), such factors do not
necessarily explain the discontinuity. Instead, the disproportionate increase in benefits
use at 427 days prior to retirement might suggest that the Swedish UI setting induce
moral hazard. However, we cannot exclude confounding factors by just looking at the
graph, nor that the discontinuity is significant at the 427-days threshold. Thus, we ana-
lyze the threshold in two steps: first by testing the discontinuity in a local linear regression
framework, and second, by evaluating a placebo threshold.
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Figure 2: Weekly payments of benefits
Notes: This figure shows weekly benefit payments over days to retirement. Each payment
is plotted unconditional of other payments (there is no individual dimension in the figure).
Payments are binned into monthly averages for 60 months prior to retirement. The dashed red
line is the 427-days threshold and the corresponding dashed grey lines are 427 days intervals.
To test the discontinuity, we estimate local linear regressions for di↵erent bandwidths
and polynomials. A larger bandwidth widens the sample away from the threshold, which
reduces the variance while retracting significance from the threshold. Formally, we esti-
mate the following specification:
Bt = ↵+ Dt +  1(Rt   k) +  2(Rt   k)2 +  3(Rt   k)D
+  4(Rt   k)2D +Xt + ⌘t
(3)
where Bt is a dummy variable that indicates if there is payment at day t, D is a treatment
dummy that denotes where the chosen threshold occurs, Rt is days to retirement, which is
our running variable. Rt is defined as k  ⌧  X  k+ ⌧ where k is the chosen threshold
and ⌧ is the bandwidth. In addition, Xt is a vector of control variables attached to each
payment, which includes demographics variables, geographic information of counties, time
of entry into the UI system, A-kassa membership status and individual identification.
While each payment is separated from the individual identification to construct the
running variable, we reintroduce the personal identification into the regressions as a con-
trol. This makes it possible to control for individual confounders. We also use interactions
between the treatment dummy and the running variable to let the slopes flexibly di↵er
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at both sides of the threshold. This is necessary to model the correct functional form of
the running variable (Lee and Lemieuxa, 2010). In addition, we estimate the regression
for both the first and second order polynomial of the running variable, which allows for
a non-linear functional form. We exclude higher order polynomials because it leads to
noisy estimates and poor approximation of standard errors (Gelman and Imbens, 2014).
Table 2 reports the results from equation (3) without the vector of controls for di↵erent
bandwidths. The columns without interactions or polynomials show a significant increase
around the threshold. These coe cients are quite robust over bandwidths and becomes
increasingly significant with the larger samples. However, by introducing more flexible
specifications the results become noisy and even shift sign. This suggests that there is
no discontinuity in number of payments around the 427-days threshold. Instead, benefit
payments seem to follow a smoothly increasing function, which is also supported by the
monthly bins of payments in Figure 2. Thus, this general increase in the use of benefits
are in line with the hypothesis of declining labor market opportunities for older workers.
In addition, moral hazard could both explain the narrow increase at the threshold and
the overall rise in benefits use. The corresponding regressions with a full set of control
variables does not alter the coe cients (see Table A.1 in the appendix). This provides
evidence that confounding factors play a minor role determining the relationship between
benefits use and days to retirement.
We continue by running equation (3) with a placebo threshold, 854 days away from
retirement. Table 3 reports the results from this local linear regression. Here, we note
that the previous results might be deceptive, as there is a comparable increase at 427-days
away from the original threshold. Likewise, these placebo thresholds are not significant
for more flexible specifications. The results from the corresponding placebo regressions
with controls show similar estimates (see Table A.2 in the appendix). Nonetheless, the
results resemble that of an exponential function, similar to the distribution of payments in
Figure 2. This function is smooth and there is no significant discontinuity in the number
of payments. Consequently, these regressions indicate that there is no disproportionate
use in payments around the 427-days threshold. We further explore discontinuities in
started spells to explain the increase in benefits use.
B. Started Unemployment Insurance Spells
In this subsection, we examine started UI spells around the 427-days threshold. The
method draws upon the findings in the previous subsection, where we established a positive
correlation between payments and the worker’s age. Because there was no discontinuity
in payments, we proceed to test whether the increase in payments is driven by started
UI spells at the specific threshold. The intuition builds on the theoretical section, where
people seek to retire at 427 days prior to retirement to receive the full length of benefits
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while holding income losses at a minimum. This argument assumes that people are able
to self-select into unemployment.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of started spells binned into monthly averages. The
first bin starts at 1 800 days prior to retirement. Similar to the distribution of payments,
started UI spells increase quickly around 854 days prior to the o cial retirement age. But,
unlike the distribution of payments, there is a peak at the 427-day threshold followed by
sharp decline. There is also a notable jump is the distribution at the 427-days threshold.
Hence, this distribution contradicts the hypothesis of declining productivity with age. If
this hypothesis would be the main explanation to early retirement, we expect an increase
in the number of started UI spells up until retirement. Instead, the plot indicates that
individuals are aware of the specific rules in Swedish UI system. Because the distribution
peaks exactly at 427 days prior to 65 indicates some sort of maximizing behavior, and
that individuals try to receive the maximum amount of benefits before retirement.
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Figure 3: Started UI spells
Notes: The figure plots the distribution of started UI spells binned into monthly averages. The
red dashed line is the 427-days threshold. The grey dashed lines mark yearly intervals to the
retirement age of 65.
This result is in line with our hypothesis saying that individuals should respond to in-
centives inherited in the UI system. Also, the pattern in the data corresponds to the
prediction of our model, which suggest that individuals should time their early retirement
through the UI system according to the maximum length benefits. Figure 3 does also pro-
pose that moral hazard is present in the Swedish UI system. However, despite the bunch
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of started spell around the 427-days threshold, we cannot exclude that some individuals
seem to be content with starting spells slightly before or after this point. This relates to
our discussion on bounded rationality, which proposes that individuals seek a satisfactory
rather than an optimal solution.
In order to test the significance of the discontinuity of started UI spells at the 427-days
threshold, we use common manipulation tests. This allows us to simultaneously assess
whether there is selection around the threshold and if the discontinuity is significant.
It is increasingly common in the bunching literature to use manipulation tests to check
for selection around arbitrary thresholds (Kleven, 2016). If the test shows significant
selection, it implies that there is a discontinuity and that a disproportionate number of
spells start at the threshold.
First, we employ McCrary’s density test (McCrary, 2008) that divides the running
variable into equally sized bins with their respective frequencies and estimates a local
linear regression with the frequencies as the dependent variable. Figure 4 shows the
result from McCrary’s density test for a restricted sample, starting with observations at
900 days prior to retirement. In addition, the red line marks the 427-days threshold
and the inner lines show the point estimates for the discontinuity. The discontinuity is
significant at a five percent level for the pre-selected number of bins and indicates that
there is selection after the threshold.
0
.0005
.001
.0015
.002
−500050010001500
Figure 4: McCrary’s density test
Notes: The figure plots McCrary’s density test. Around the threshold, the outer lines marks
the confidence intervals for the point estimates (the bold inner lines). This graph use 20 bins
(pre-selected) with a p-value equal to 0.045. See Table A.3 in the appendix for additional bin
selections and p-values.
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Although the McCrary test is commonly used to test for manipulation, it is less suitable
for handling a discrete running variable and smaller samples. In our case, the significance
for the discontinuity is slightly below the five percent level and it is sensitive to di↵erent
bin selections (see Table A.3 in the appendix). This is because the McCrary test uses
pre-binning of the running variable. Consequently, pre-binning lowers the standard errors
for the null hypothesis of no manipulation, and might excessively reject that there is no
manipulation (Frandsen, 2017). To test the robustness of the McCrary test, we use a
similar method proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2016a) that avoids the pre-binning, which
performs better in small samples and allows for both bandwidth selection and flexible
specification of polynomials. One concern raised in Cattaneo et al. (2016b) is that first-
order polynomials also wrongfully rejects the null of no manipulation.
Table 4 shows the results from Cattaneo’s density test for di↵erent bandwidths and
polynomial orders. Reassuringly, our estimates are significant over di↵erent polynomial
orders, which provides further robustness that selection occurs at the threshold. The
smaller bandwidths are significant although they use fewer observations, while the wider
bandwidths are insignificant. This is in line with the finding that selection happens quite
close to threshold. Furthermore, larger bandwidths are likely to miss the mechanism at
the threshold.
Table 4: Discontinuity test for selection
Polynomial order
Bandwidth (Days) p = 1 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4
25 .0013⇤⇤⇤ .015⇤⇤⇤ .0028⇤⇤⇤ 0.0034⇤⇤⇤
(.0003) (.0004) (.0006) (.0012)
50 .0001 .001⇤⇤⇤ .003⇤⇤⇤ .003⇤⇤⇤
(.0002) (.0003) (.0005) (.0007)
100 -.0002 -.0003 0.0008⇤⇤⇤ .0011⇤⇤⇤
(.00012) (.0002) (.0003) (.0004)
150 .00002 -.0003 -0.00032 .0002
(.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Notes: The table shows manipulation density estimates for several bandwidths and polynomial
orders (for the running variable). The bandwidth B=25 use 310 e↵ective observations on each side of
the threshold, B=50 use 654 e↵ective observations, B=100 use 1220 e↵ective observations and B=150
use 1714. For details regarding rddensity see Cattaneo et al. (2016a). Statistical significance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
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We highlight three properties from these results. First, while the selection is significant
it is likely to understate the mechanism. This is because people are unable to precisely
manipulate when to enter unemployment. Hence, people who seek to use the full length
of benefits before retirement could be content with a second-best alternative, which could
explain the slopes at both sides of the threshold. Second, there is a considerable increase
in started spells, more than three times as high at the threshold compared to the initial
level. It is likely that the excess in started spells drives the increase in benefit payments.
This suggest that there is moral hazard in the use of benefits. Furthermore, the downward
sloping pattern after the threshold strengthen the case that it is moral hazard and not
productivity that drives benefits use. Otherwise, the started UI spells would continue to
grow until retirement. Third, the manipulation around the threshold implies a certain
degree of awareness. This corresponds to the category of people who use benefits in a
calculated way. In accordance, the pecuniary gain seems to exceed the stigma associated
with living on benefits. However, we cannot exclude that started spells would be fewer in
some alternative social context.
C. Robustness Tests and Heterogeneity
In the previous subsections, we established that there is a steep increase in benefits pay-
ments close to retirement, and that these payments are driven by started UI spells. Yet,
these results exclude two potential explanations: first, does the increase in initiated UI
spells depend on excessive entries into the UI system, and second, is the increase in ben-
efit payments driven by increased durations? The latter adds a complementary question
whether individuals di↵er in their durations depending on their historical benefits usage.
Thus, we examine if longstanding members feel entitled to claim benefits close to retire-
ment. According to Lindbeck (1995), benefits from welfare systems are often described
today as ”citizens’ rights” or entitlements, for which the individual has qualified by paying
contributions earlier. In general, individuals are assumed to be less hesitant to live on
benefit schemes the more they have previously contributed to the system. We therefore
construct an entitlement measure where we divide historical usage of benefits with the
length of the membership. Thus, a low value means high entitlement, and vice versa.
In Figure 5, we plot entries starting at 1 800 days prior to retirement, where the entries
are binned into monthly averages. We expect strategic individuals to enter at least one
year prior to the threshold, which is the minimum membership length for becoming eligible
for full benefits. The distribution of entries is noisy and reveals no clear pattern. Those
few bins that are seemingly high are no outliers considering the full sample of entries
(see Figure A.3 in the appendix). Furthermore, entries close to retirement are negatively
correlated with days to retirement. This could be because the benefit of joining an A-
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Figure 5: Entries into the UI system
Notes: The figure shows entries into the UI system over days to retirement for 1800 days prior
to retirement age. Entries are binned into monthly averages. The red dashed line marks the
427-day threshold while the grey lines are yearly markers away from the threshold.
kassa decreases with age, or due to reduced uncertainty regarding income and health as
an older worker. Overall, the distribution of entries shows no clear sign of selection close
to retirement. This indicates that excessive entries do not drive the bunching in started
UI spells.
The other potential explanation to increased benefits use is UI durations. If the
durations are longer, the frequencies of unconditional payments will increase. Figure 6
plots the average number of UI weeks, given the individual entitlement, for three di↵erent
time-spans. We restrict the sample to cover people with at least ten years of membership.
There is a clear di↵erence in durations given time period and entitlement. The spans
of 427 days at each side of our 427-days threshold plots almost identical distributions; a
sharp increase for high entitlements (low ratio) that flattens out for individuals with lower
entitlements. In contrast, the green line marks the average duration for an additional span
of 427 days away from the threshold. In this time span, those with high entitlement use
about half the durations compared to those close to the threshold. Furthermore, because
the average duration is considerably longer closer to the o cial retirement age, around
the 427-days threshold, strengthens the hypothesis that individuals use UI benefits as an
early retirement scheme. The extended length of later UI spells suggest that individuals
do not reenter the labor market after becoming unemployed. Instead they seem to exit
the labor market through the UI system.
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Figure 6: Entitlement and average duration
Notes: This figure plots the average duration (weeks) per period over the individual entitlement
level. The series shows 427 days spans prior to retirement. High entitlement (closer towards
zero) equals a low total use of UI benefits relative to the membership duration.
We highlight two findings from Figure 6. First, without entitlement as an component
which a↵ects the retirement decision, we expect people with low historical usage of benefits
to use less benefits than those with high historical usage. This is because our entitlement
measure also measures the historical risk of unemployment. Thus, without entitlement,
the average durations should be shorter for those with low historical use, which is similar
to the green line. In contrast, the red and blue show high average durations even for
those with low historical use. Likewise, the lines converge for those with low entitlement
(high ratio), which suggests that those individuals behave similar irrespective of days to
retirement. Consequently, this suggest that entitlement a↵ects the retirement decision
more for those with higher entitlement. Second, the red and blue lines are similar in
durations and entitlements. Previous results indicate that both benefit payments and
started UI spells starts to increase sharply about 854 days prior to the retirement age.
Hence, the selection into early retirement might occur before the threshold. Although this
evidence is descriptive, it sheds light on the potential underlying mechanism that drives
benefits use.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether Swedish workers use UI benefits as a pathway to
retirement. In Sweden, workers are eligible for benefits for a maximum of 427 days.
This creates an artificial benefit threshold at 427 days prior to the o cial retirement
age that provides exogenous variation. We exploit this variation by using a novel quasi-
experimental approach that is inspired by the empirical literature of bunching. The
analysis builds on unique Swedish data consisting of a detailed longitudinal register of UI
benefit payments for the period 1999 to 2015.
Our quasi-experimental strategy allows us to both identify moral hazard and to detect
how UI benefits induce early retirement. The sharp peak in the number of started UI spells
at the 427-days threshold shows that individuals try to maximize benefits before exiting
the labor market. In addition, the extended average length of unemployment spells for
older workers indicates that they do not re-enter the labor market after becoming unem-
ploymed. Instead, they seem to exit the labor force through a final unemployment spell.
Given these evidence, we conclude that Swedish workers self-select into early retirement
by using UI benefits.
Our main results have several implications. First, our results suggest that individuals
act in a strategic and well-planned manner. The clear pattern in the data would not
be possible unless a significant proportion of the individuals are informed regarding how
to maximize benefits. Hence, the prediction of our model, which suggested that early
retirement decisions should bunch at the maximum length of benefits, is fairly accurate.
On the contrary, we cannot disregard that a fairly large share of the UI spells did not start
at the threshold. Thus, we cannot completely reject complementary explanations, such
as bounded rationality, which suggest that individuals seek a satisfying outcome rather
than an optimal one. Second, we cannot exclude the possibility that started spells at the
427-days threshold are employer initiated rather than driven by the employee. However,
given the exact timing of the spell start and given the strong labor market protection for
older workers in Sweden, we find it more likely that the decision is voluntarily. Third, to
what degree social norms influence the early retirement decision is hard to derive from our
results. According to Akerlof and Kranton (2000), individual’s willingness to adhere to
social norms is determined by the social stigma they experience when opposing a desirable
behaviour. Our results show that the there is no social stigma strong enough to prohibit
all workers from using the UI system as an early retirement scheme.
One limitation of our findings is the degree of external validity. The Swedish UI
system is rather unique and it is unclear whether the maximum length of benefits would
impose similar discontinuities in benefit usage for workers in other countries. Nonetheless,
our results confirm basic economic theory and previous studies showing that individuals
respond to incentives inherent in UI systems. It is therefore reasonable that similar early
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retirement behavior could be observed in other contexts.
In terms of further studies, there are several potential research questions that follow
from our results. First, due to the construction of our data we were unable to divide our
data into subgroups. Hence, a potential research question is to investigate whether various
occupational groups in Sweden, in di↵erent unemployment insurance funds, act dissimilar
at the threshold. Another relevant research question is to include all UI members –
and not only those that use benefits prior to retirement – by scaling up the sample size
considerably. This would clarify the extent of the early retirement problem in proportion
to the whole UI system.
Based on the theory of moral hazard, the state subsidies of the Swedish UI system
contribute to early labor market exits. However, if policy makers would address the issue
of moral hazard by withdrawing subsidies it would a↵ect the UI protection of younger
workers as well. The purpose of a UI system is to ease economic hardship of job losers
and improve matching on the labor market, among other things (Inderbitzin et al., 2016).
Thus, by adjusting benefit levels or the maximum benefit duration, the government also
has to consider adverse e↵ects on other groups. A more concentrated policy implication is
to address the issue of asymmetric information through monitoring. While earlier studies
focus on the increased likelihood of early retirement due to UI benefits, our approach
implies that we can identify the timing of the retirement decision. Hence, by developing
methods for better monitoring of older workers around the threshold, it might be possible
to both detect and avoid early retirement through the UI system. Provided these methods
are e cient enough to address moral hazard, compared to its implementation costs, it
could increase social welfare.
23
References
Akerlof, G. A. and R. E. Kranton (2000). Economics and identity. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 115 (3), 715–753.
Allen, E. J., P. M. Dechow, D. G. Pope, and G. Wu (2016). Reference-dependent prefer-
ences: Evidence from marathon runners. Management Science.
Busse, M. R., N. Lacetera, D. G. Pope, J. Silva-Risso, and J. R. Sydnor (2013). Estimating
the e↵ect of salience in wholesale and retail car markets. The American Economic
Review 103 (3), 575–579.
Card, D., R. Chetty, and A. Weber (2007). Cash-on-hand and competing models of
intertemporal behavior: New evidence from the labor market. The Quarterly journal
of economics 122 (4), 1511–1560.
Cattaneo, M. D., M. Jansson, and X. Ma (2016a). rddensity: Manipulation testing based
on density discontinuity. The Stata Journal (ii), 1–18.
Cattaneo, M. D., M. Jansson, and X. Ma (2016b). Simple local regression distribution
estimators with an application to manipulation testing. Unpublished Working Paper,
University of Michigan, and University of California Berkeley .
Chetty, R. (2008). Moral hazard versus liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance.
Journal of political Economy 116 (2), 173–234.
Clasen, J. (2011). Regulating the risk of unemployment: National adaptations to post-
industrial labour markets in Europe. Oxford University Press.
Conlisk, J. (1996). Why bounded rationality? Journal of economic literature 34 (2),
669–700.
Dorn, D. and A. Sousa-Poza (2010). ‘voluntary’and ‘involuntary’early retirement: an
international analysis. Applied Economics 42 (4), 427–438.
Feldstein, M. and J. B. Liebman (2002). Social security. Handbook of public economics 4,
2245–2324.
Fitzenberger, B. and R. A. Wilke (2010). Unemployment durations in west germany
before and after the reform of the unemployment compensation system during the
1980s. German Economic Review 11 (3), 336–366.
Frandsen, B. R. (2017). Party bias in union representation elections: Testing for ma-
nipulation in the regression discontinuity design when the running variable is discrete.
24
In Regression Discontinuity Designs: Theory and Applications, pp. 281–315. Emerald
Publishing Limited.
Gelman, A. and G. Imbens (2014). Why high-order polynomials should not be used
in regression discontinuity designs. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Go¨bel, C. and T. Zwick (2009). Age and productivity-evidence from linked employer
employee data.
Gruber, J. and D. Wise (1998). Social security and retirement: An international compar-
ison. The American Economic Review 88 (2), 158–163.
Gruber, J. and D. Wise (2000). Social security programs and retirement around the world.
In Research in Labor Economics, pp. 1–40. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Hairault, J.-O., F. Langot, S. Me´nard, and T. Sopraseuth (2012). Optimal unemployment
insurance for older workers. Journal of Public Economics 96 (5), 509–519.
Hausman, J. A. and D. A. Wise (1985). Social security, health status, and retirement. In
Pensions, labor, and individual choice, pp. 159–192. University of Chicago Press.
Hindriks, J. and G. D. Myles (2013). Intermediate public economics. MIT press.
Inderbitzin, L., S. Staubli, and J. Zweimu¨ller (2016). Extended unemployment benefits
and early retirement: Program complementarity and program substitution. American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8 (1), 253–288.
Katz, L. F. and B. D. Meyer (1990). The impact of the potential duration of unemploy-
ment benefits on the duration of unemployment. Journal of public economics 41 (1),
45–72.
Kjellberg, A. (2010). Vilka” hoppade av” a-kassan eller avstod fr˚an att g˚a med? en studie
av akassornas medlemsras. Studies in Social Policy, Industrial Relations, Working Life
and Mobility. Research Reports 3.
Kjellberg, A. and C. L. Ibsen (2016). Attacks on union organizing. In Den Danske Model
Set Udefra. Jurist-og Økonomforbundets Forlag.
Kleven, H. J. (2016). Bunching. Annual Review of Economics 8, 435–464.
Kyyra¨, T. and V. Ollikainen (2008). To search or not to search? the e↵ects of ui benefit
extension for the older unemployed. Journal of Public Economics 92 (10), 2048–2070.
25
Lalive, R. (2008). How do extended benefits a↵ect unemployment duration? a regression
discontinuity approach. Journal of Econometrics 142 (2), 785–806.
Lalive, R., J. Van Ours, and J. Zweimu¨ller (2006). How changes in financial incentives
a↵ect the duration of unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies 73 (4), 1009–
1038.
Lee, D. S. and T. Lemieuxa (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics. Journal
of economic literature 48 (2), 281–355.
Lindbeck, A. (1995). Hazardous welfare-state dynamics. The American Economic Re-
view 85 (2), 9–15.
Lindbeck, A. and M. Persson (2017). Social norms in social insurance. Journal of Political
Economy , Forthcoming.
Manoli, D. and A. Weber (2016). Nonparametric evidence on the e↵ects of financial
incentives on retirement decisions. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8 (4),
160–182.
McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity
design: A density test. Journal of econometrics 142 (2), 698–714.
Mo tt, R. (1985). Unemployment insurance and the distribution of unemployment spells.
Journal of Econometrics 28 (1), 85–101.
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The quarterly journal of
economics 69 (1), 99–118.
26
Appendix
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 to
ta
l p
ay
m
en
ts
01000200030004000500060007000
Days to retirement
Figure A.1: Unconditional distribution of weekly payments
Notes: The figure shows the full distribution of payments for the sample, 2,198,228 in total,
over days to retirement. The solid red line marks the 427-days threshold and the red dashed
lines are yearly markers away from the retirement age of 65. The sample covers payments for
the period 1999-2015.
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Figure A.2: Unconditional distribution of started UI spells
Notes: The figure plots the full distribution of started UI spells, 23,090 in total, over days to
retirement. The solid red line marks the 427-days threshold and the red dashed lines are yearly
markers away from the o cial retirement age.
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Figure A.3: Unconditional distribution of entries into the UI system
Notes: The figure shows the full distribution of entries into the UI system over days to retire-
ment, for the whole sample. These are 21,135 in total. The solid red line marks the 427-days
threshold and the red dashed lines are 10-year markers away from the retirement age of 65.
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Figure A.4: Started UI spells close to the threshold
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of started UI spells (900 days prior to retirement).
The dashed grey line is the 427-days threshold. This distribution is used in the McCrary tests.
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Table A.3: McCrary test statistic
Number of bins
20 25 30
Discontinuity .183⇤ .135⇤⇤ 0.072⇤
P-value 0.045 0.055 0.070
Notes: This table shows point estimates and corresponding p-values for the McCrary test with
di↵erent bin selections. The p-value grows with the number of bins which is a possible problem with
the McCrary test for discrete variables (Frandsen, 2017). Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, *p<0.1
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